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                                           “There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about 
                                            by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come  
                                                sooner as a result of the voluntary abandonment   of further credit expansion, 
                                                or later  as  a  final  and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.”                                                                          
                                                                         
                                                                         
  
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics 
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Global financial crisis of 2007-2009 had brought about huge losses imposed upon financial institutions and 
non-financial corporations, producers and consumers. Customers were overloaded with houses, once abundant 
credit evaporated, world trade and production were severely disrupted, and unemployment dramatically 
increased1. Though, as usual, “this time was different”, the real market failures were preceded by a credit crunch 
as it had always been in economic history. 
An important aspect of the last crisis, comprising its devastating effects upon the intellectual projection of 
national economies and finance, is to be stressed specially. In this respect, one of the consequences of the credit 
crunch was a spectacular demise of the concept of “market fundamentalism” (Soros, 2006).It included, 
naturally, its macroeconomic and financial projection – the “representative agent” model. Barrage of criticisms 
and negations addressing the latter were justified by a remarkable failure of theoretical attempts to detect and 
foresee the upcoming crisis (Economist, 2009). It should be noted that such attempts were not, mildly speaking, 
encouraged, especially within the then dominant theory of “rational expectations”. Even more, the mere subject 
of crises was effectively excluded from the main body of that concept (Lucas, 2003). On the other hand, being 
calmed down by a prolonged period of “Great Moderation”, economists of the mainstream school had lost, to 
some degree, their interests in the analysis of cycles and extreme (or “fat tail”) events like systemic bubbles 
and crises. Quite understandably, once critical phenomena had been declared as virtually nonexistent, the 
“representative agent” model, by implication, was elevated to the class of universality. Hence, the entire, the 
then dominant, theoretical paradigm was doomed to ignore the complexity of a modern financial system and 
irregularities of extreme events being born by its evolution, especially on a macrolevel. The mere inability of 
the mainstream theory to explain and predict the credit crunch of 2007-09 sparked the interest of practitioners 
to the apocryphal ideas in economics, the Minsky instability hypothesis in particular (Yellen, 2009). 
In our opinion, the inadequacy of a “rational investor” model was rooted in its unreserved reliance on a 
methodology of reductionism which, in our view, could be ascribed as the causa sine of the impotence of the 
model, its failure to identify and predict, in advance, credit crunch of 2007. As known, the reductionism 
declares, unconditionally, the existence of similarity of any system to its (typical) element, and in a guise of a 
“rational” investor, that doctrine became a dominant theoretical engine in a science of finance. The “rational 
investor” model dominance has been continued for several decades, in spite of the fact that its inadequacy to 
the actual financial markets was well known and extensively documented (Eichengreen, 2003; Mandelbrot, 
2005; Moessner, 2010).  
Unconditional similarity contradicts to the modern complex systems theory, especially to its parts which are 
focused on the analysis of the so called “critical points” where a general system transforms its quality and 
behavior (Stanley et al, 2003). The methodology of reductionism turned out to be largely at odds with financial 
activity, for, as a rule, financial markets appear to be scale free only under very special conditions, near some 
critical point, for example. Hence the assertion of a system’s similarity to its element, while being relevant 
under some conditions, cannot be justified in general. A huge body of evidence suggests that market 
transformations, similar to credit crunches, take place typically at critical points. Since financial system evolves 
largely as a laminar flow while infrequently, under some specific conditions, producing bursts of turbulence, 
the endogenous mechanism of such “switches” is of great importance. Possibly, this mechanism could be 
                                                          
1 The author is grateful to the participants of seminars at the London School of Economics, the National Research 
University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow) and some financial firms in the City. He is especially thankful to 
Professors Avinash Dixit, Charles Goodhard, Fuad Aleskerov and Emil Yershov whose comments were important for the 
model elaboration. Yet nobody, except the author, bears any responsibility for possible inconsistencies of the paper.  
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viewed as a transformation of heterogeneous (“normal”) markets into homogeneous ones as a result, for 
example, of a bubble burst due to sudden disappearance of buyers that is trailed by market illiquidity.  
The rational agent model, as it became increasingly noticeable, has proved to be incapable to identify properly 
and filter out extreme events that appear near critical points, including bubbles or crises. For example, Gaussian 
distribution of events which is an imminent part of the “rational investor” model under uncertainty, returns a 
practically zero probability of a would be crisis. This result, scientifically quite correct, served, in its turn, as a 
solid argument supporting the virtual nonexistence of extreme events in finance2. Logically, though, it is a false 
inference since empirical data should be correctly identified as the evidence of “no crises”. Hence the error 
might appear as a product of logical fallacy – empirical data containing “no evidence of crises” were interpreted, 
wrongly, as containing an “evidence of no crises” (B. Russell, Chicken Paradox, 1924) 3. The latter, quite 
naturally, implied the conclusion of the “crises nonexistence”, at least in the modern finance. Looking from 
this angle, an assessment of a rational investor model as a universal theory resembles the error of the second 
kind in testing of statistical hypotheses:  instead of rejecting the wrong null hypothesis of “nonexistence of 
crises”, the latter was put into foundation of a theory that pretended to be a universal one.  
Devastating failure of the rational investor model being applied to the  study of credit crunch 2008-09 has 
validated an unprecedented search for the “New Economic Paradigm” (Stiglitz, 2010) including comprehensive 
revision of basic premises of a financial science4. This search was initiated and followed by leading scientists 
including J. Stiglitz, P. Krugman, G. Akerlof and R. Schiller, D. Farmer  - to mention just a few. An important 
avenue of these intellectual activities is an investigation of the mechanism of financial bubbles and crises, their 
study as complex, uncertain and hierarchically organized phenomena. Although bubbles and crises are macro-
financial phenomena, financial activity on a macro- level, contrary to microfinance, has been, for different 
reasons, a relatively underdeveloped part of modern finance.  
As one of the participants of the 2011 INET Conference remarked, the “ new economic thinking means reading 
of the old books”. It is a half-jest, in fact, for the principles of a new economic thinking were laid firmly down 
in works of J. M. Keynes, I. Fischer, H. Minsky, H. Simon, B. Mandelbrot. Their ideas, as well as scientific 
results of some contemporary researchers, especially those who emphasized  the importance of studying 
phenomena of “animal spirit”, “herding” or “irrational exuberance” has formed, in effect, foundations of a 
macrofinancial theory, including the analysis of bubbles and crises. In our view, the new paradigm should go 
along the avenues of a complex system methodology. The latter provided researcher with a wide spectrum of 
methods and models (Encyclopedia, 2009) that were gratefully acknowledged, for often the same approach   
have long been used the economic theory itself. The intertwined fields of research on copula models, firms 
growth, econophysics, portfolio defaults, currency crises and sovereign defaults could be mentioned in this 
context (Vasicek, 1987; Lux, 2006; Li,2000; Hull, 2011). 
Theoretical generalizations of a financial history, as it had been investigated and described by such prominent 
minds as L. vonMises, F. vonHyek, M. Friedman and A. Schwartz,  J.K. Galbraith,  C. Kindleberger, 
                                                          
2 On the “Black Monday”, October 16, 1987, Standard&Poor’s500 Index had dropped about 34 standard deviations which 
for Gaussian distribution corresponds to the probability of  2.6 × 10−256. In practice, such an extreme event could had 
never  happened (Stanley,et al,2003). 
3 A persuasive exposition of the “Chicken Paradox” can be found in (Taleb, 2010). 
4 There is some irony in the name of “the modern finance” which the mainstream financial theory took possession of to 
identify itself. In fact, its foundations had been formulated about at least half-a-century ago. That does not mean, of course, 
that all the hypotheses underlying the mainstream theory are wrong but, on the other hand, the mere proclaiming their 
adequacy to the complexities of modern financial markets looks a bit arbitrary, and imposing some inherently dangerous 
consequences. 
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P.Krugman, B. Eichengreen  - to mention just a few - might be viewed as a reconstruction of  a single realization 
of a stochastic process. The latter could possess  many features with some of them totally unknown. The 
development of a financial system, being a flow of funds in time, cannot, generally, be considered a laminar 
process. In the long run it had always been subject to sudden and aperiodic bursts of heavy turbulence, caused 
by internal and external shocks. Episodes of the turbulence, though being relatively rare (the Poisson process), 
have been subject of thorough investigation since long ago economists had been aware of their strong impact 
upon the system. If amplitudes of fluctuations were extremely large, such events would be called crises. The 
importance of their study was emphasized by numerous facts of devastating influence of crises upon the 
structure and behavior of a financial system due to huge losses imposed upon the wealth of nations, both private 
and public.  
Financial bubbles were always forerunners of crises. The modern financial system analysis takes the view on 
bubbles in a context of “large asset price deviations”   from their fundamental value (Rajan, 2005). Similar 
ideas were developed and investigated in (Turner, 2010) who wrote that “all liquid financial markets are 
susceptible to unstable divergence from equilibrium values”. Such a general system approach takes essentially 
into account market interactions responsible for qualitative changes in the aggregate system. Irrationality or 
herding of financial investors bears responsibility for asset price divergence that under particular conditions 
emerges and brings about a system’s collapse. The possibility of persistent deviations of asset prices from their 
fundamental value was shown in for AR (1) stochastic processes (Campbell and Shiller, 1992). This paper 
makes an attempt to describe prices divergence at the critical point (where a system becomes singular) by 
appealing to investors’ actions and motivations on the macrofinancial scale.  Investigation of a system’s 
behavior around the point of singularity is of vital importance since it would provide essential clues to our 
understanding of “how markets fail” (Cassidy, 2009).  
The complex system approach in finance could be described through the concept of entanglement. The concept 
of entanglement bears the same features as a definition of a complex system given by a group of physicists 
working in a field of finance (Stanley et al, 2003). As they defined it – in a complex system all depends upon 
everything. Just as in the complex system the notion of entanglement is a statement acknowledging 
interdependence of all the counterparties in financial markets including financial and non-financial 
corporations, the government and the central bank. How to identify entanglement empirically? Stanley H.E. et 
al formulated the process of scientific study in finance as a search for patterns. Such a search, going on under 
the auspice of “econophysics”, could exemplify a thorough analysis of a complex and unstructured assemblage 
of actual data being finalized in the discovery and experimental validation of an appropriate pattern. On the 
other side of a spectrum, some patterns underlying the actual processes might be discovered due to synthesizing 
a vast amount of historical and anecdotal information by applying appropriate reasoning and logical 
deliberations. The Austrian School of Economic Thought which, in its extreme form, rejects application of any 
formalized systems, or modeling of any kind, could be viewed as an example. A logical question follows out 
this comparison: Is there exists any intermediate way of searching for regular patters in finance and economics? 
It should be pointed out, that in our opinion, though these patterns imply the existence of some stable structures, 
the latter were not necessarily could be exploited, say, by practical investors5. 
 
Importantly, patterns could be discovered by developing rather simple models of money and debt 
interrelationships. Debt cycles were studied extensively by many schools of economic thought (Akerlof, 
Shiller, 2009). Some important characteristics of such a cycle could be revealed in the financial system 
                                                          
5 Econophysical studies show that in many cases persistent features of random processes of non-Gaussian kind do not 
support arbitrage profits (Lillo, Farmer, 2004) 
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development at the turn of the century. The modern financial system worked by spreading risk, promoting 
economic efficiency and providing cheap capital. It had been formed during these years as bull markets in 
shares and bonds originated in the early 1990s. These markets were propelled by abundance of money, falling 
interest rates and new information technology. Financial markets, by combining debt and derivatives, could 
originate and distribute huge quantities of risky structurized products and sell them to different investors. 
Meanwhile, financial sector debt, only a tenth of the size of non-financial-sector debt in 1980, became half as 
big by the beginning of the credit crunch in 2007.  As liquidity grew, banks could buy more assets, borrow 
more against them, and enjoy their value rose. By 2007 financial services were making 40% of America’s 
corporate profits while employing only 5% of its private sector workers. Thanks to cheap money, banks could 
have taken on more debt and, by designing complex structurized products, they were able to make their 
investment more profitable and risky. Securitization facilitating the emergence of the “shadow banking” system 
foments, simultaneously, bubbles on different segments of a global financial market. 
 
Yet over the past decade this system, or a big part of it, began to lose touch with its ultimate purpose: to 
reallocate deficit resources in accordance with the social priorities (BCBS, 2004). Instead of writing, managing 
and trading claims on future cashflows for the rest of the economy, finance became increasingly a game for 
fees and speculation. Due to disastrously lax regulation, investment banks did not lay aside enough capital in 
case something went wrong, and, as the crisis began in the middle of 2007, credit markets started to freeze up 
(Inquiry Report, 2011). Qualitatively, after the spectacular Lehman Brothers disaster in September 2008,   
laminar flows of financial activity came to an end.  Banks began to suffer losses on their holdings of toxic 
securities and were reluctant to lend to one another that led to shortages of funding system. This only intensified 
in late 2007 when Nothern Rock, a British mortgage lender, experienced a bank run that started in the money 
markets. All of a sudden, liquidity became in a short supply, debt was unwound, and investors were forced to 
sell and write down the assets.  For several years, up to now, the market counterparties no longer trust each 
other. As Walter Bagehot, an authority on bank runs, once wrote:” Every banker knows that if he has to prove 
that he is worth of credit, however good may be his arguments, in fact his credit is gone.” (The Economist, 
2008).  In an entangled financial system, his axiom should be stretched out to the whole market. And it means, 
precisely, financial meltdown or the crisis. 
 
The most fascinating feature of the post-crisis era on financial markets was the continuation of a ubiquitous 
liquidity expansion. To fight the market squeeze, all the major central banks have greatly expanded their 
balance sheets. The latter rose, roughly, from about 10 percent to 25-30 percent of GDP for the appropriate 
economies. For several years after the credit crunch 2007-09, central banks bought trillions of dollars of toxic 
and government debts thus increasing, without any precedent in modern history, money issuance. 
Paradoxically, this enormous credit expansion, though accelerating for several years, has been accompanied by 
a stagnating and depressed real economy . Yet, until now, central bankers are worried with downside risks and 
threats of price deflation, mainly. Yet. 
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This preprint is a completely revised version of the previous paper (Smirnov, 2011). Methodologically the 
proposed model is aimed to reveal important patterns in the behavior of a simplified financial system viewed 
as an intertwined feedback between money and debt collaterized by real resources. Such patterns are detected 
as cycles consisting of debt bubbles and crises. Financial cycles have a well defined structure and form periodic 
sequences along the credit expansion though in terms of time they are of stochastic nature. Bubbles are defined 
as “large asset price deviations” from their fundamental value while crises represent huge losses of financial 
wealth. Regular sequences of bubbles and crises are explained in the model via behavior of market participants 
whose collective actions facilitate either crises or their postponement due to self-imposed restrictions upon the 
debt accumulation. The Hamlet dilemma paraphrase exposes the illusory character of investors’ attempts to 
avoid crises: even being postponed financial catastrophes are inevitable under regime of credit expansion. It 
was shown that probabilities of default are growing along the increasing money issuance reaching the unit value 
in the case of a total collapse.  The model distinguishes phases of normal investing, speculation and a Ponzi 
game as in the “financial instability hypothesis” elaborated by H. Minsky (Minsky, 2008). An important 
reservation should be made concerning the model validity. Since it embraces the debt markets only, the 
inflationary impact of the credit expansion is, in effect, reflected in the growing value of debts. The term 
“inflation”, in a particular sense, could be conceived as a synonym to the phenomenon of a credit expansion 
which is often the case in the works of the Austrian scholars (vonMises, 1996). It does not in contradiction, 
though, with its total absence on the real markets where inflation is registered as changes in prices of goods 
and services. If the economy in a liquidity trap, then there could be no inflation at all on the goods markets 
while asset prices are skyrocketing. Hence, supporting the assessment of the crises inevitability under the credit 
expansion, the model does not share the Austrian School doomsday predictions of exact dates of such events.  
The model captures at least four stylized facts of the modern financial system performance, shortly described 
above.  First, the model reflects dramatic changes in proportions between the real and financial markets, namely 
the fact, that the modern financial system becomes many times larger than the economy per se.  Second, it 
describes financial evolution as a process transforming simple bank intermediation into “alternative” banking. 
Third, all the money issued, in the model are spent on the new debt acquisition like in the process of quantitative 
easing, QE, where new money are issued due to debt purchases of the central bank. Four, in the process of 
money issuance the model captures its feature of the excess money accumulation. These viable features of the 
actual evolution of a  financial system are important in understanding the financial cycle pattern as it was 
thoroughly investigated both within the mainstream economic thought (J.M. Keynes, H. Minsky, C. 
Kindelberger, P. Krugman, B. Eichengreen), as well as by some prominent Austrian scholars (L. von Mises, F. 
Hayek, D. French). 
The financial market transition from laminar to turbulent regimes reveals, in terms of money issuance, the 
regular cyclic pattern of subsequent credit crunches. The latter, in terms of time, appears to be a rather irregular 
one.  Due to stochastic liquidity issuance, the model demonstrates (according to a biased random process) a 
financial system evolution towards the shadow banking system. This transition is an intermittent process for in 
its course bubbles emerge and burst sporadically, thus forming a cyclical process. The latter, on the 
macrofinancial scale, could be represented via large asset prices deviations. That theoretical concept reflects 
the switching of investors’ preferences from the market to the expected debt value. The structural change in 
investors’ orientation inherently leads to systematic asset price overvaluations. The magnitude of the asset price 
divergence reaches its maximum at the critical point of liquidity issuance being accompanied with a nonzero 
probability of systemic collapse. The latter could be associated with a relatively modest market correction. The 
system, if survived at the critical point, continues to evolve via credit expansion until the growing amount of 
liquidity erodes the purchasing power of money completely. The system comes to its ultimate and total collapse 
10 
 
when the debt reaches its zero value which might be viewed as an outcome of financial investors herding that 
brings about the so called “fat tail” financial event.  Some important features of these complex processes are 
reproduced in the proposed model.  
Stochastic differential equations in the model were solved via methodology elaborated by A.Dixit and 
R.Pindyck (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Solutions made relevant variables to be simple power functions 
combinations of which reveal regular cyclic patterns in the system’s behavior described in terms of money 
issuance.  The same approach was helpful in studying the phenomenon of “large price deviations” considered 
as one of the major sources of the cyclical pattern. Processes of herding in the financial market were 
represented, formally, as solutions to equations of the “trivial” nonlinear programming problem. The   model 
included   two types of financial risks. By hedging out the risky component of money issuance, the system was 
converted into a deterministic one. Risks to default were treated along the lines of the “financial triangle” 
approach which is common in estimation of probabilities to default. In the last part of the paper, financial 
bubble was viewed as a percolation process of forming clusters among the debt buyers. Models of such type 
are seemed adequate in investigating of microfinancial interactions among investors near the critical point 
(Smirnov,  2010). Since models of that kind are constructed within a different methodological approach, they 
are beyond the scope of the paper. 
The system behavior could be summarized as follows. Its initial configuration is given as a Keynesian two-
component market consisted of money and debt that evolves as interactions among financial investors, central 
bank and the government. The debt market is “broad” and “deep” initially, with many heterogeneous buyers 
and sellers (Malkiel, 2012). Private investors’ purchases and sales of assets influence and determine the debt 
market value.  The government, on its part, sells public debt while providing, at some levels of money issuance, 
deposit insurance which is a part of the put-to-default guarantees of the system stability. The central bank 
performs monetary policy which is subject to random shocks of internal and external nature.  Financial markets 
via gradual random increases of market liquidity evolve towards the “shadow banking system”. gradual random 
increases of market liquidity . The latter term in the model describes the system where decreasing put-to-default 
guarantees are substituted for additional credit of the call option type. Thus the central bank policy is viewed 
as a stylized description of quantitative easing policy, channeling  the  huge influx of money into  financial 
markets, while  leaving the real ones relatively immune to the unprecedented monetary stimulus. 
Under “normal” market conditions the system dynamics goes on as a standard debt monetization process. The 
latter was modeled via the debt value equation reflecting interactions between money and debt. Debt value in 
aggregate is considered as a function of a random liquidity issuance, the latter being subject to the lognormal 
distribution (geometric Brownian motion). Monetary policy is modeled as a simple stochastic differential 
equation with a positive small drift parameter. Random process of   liquidity issuance by the central bank brings 
about changes to the value of financial claims; hence all the model variables depend upon money issuance 
except the par value which is assumed to be constant. The credit availability facilitates additional debt purchases 
changing via call option written on the expected debt value.  The face value of a debt is viewed as a riskless 
debt. The total debt guarantees, in their turn, were viewed as a put option also being written on its expected 
value. Call and put options are imbedded into debt making its market value a structurized financial product. It 
has a dual representation: either as a difference between its expected value and the call option, or equivalently, 
as the par value minus the put-to-default option. The above said statement is the macrofinancial interpretation 
of a well known put - call equivalence theorem. A modified representation of that equivalence (using the basic 
accounting equation) allows for performing asset and equity value estimations. Value of equity in the system 
appears to be equal to the sum of put and call options.  
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By implying persistent substitution of the market debt value for its expected value, the model characterizes an 
emergence of a financial bubble. The author believes that its origins are rooted in the normal market conditions 
as was noted by (Cooper, 2008). The model performance is facilitated by a persistent drift in liquidity issuance 
that brings about changes in all financial variables except the par debt value. The latter is a constant viewed as 
a riskless quantity being supported by the real resources. Financial system might arrive at the critical point 
under two different regimes. By definition, normal regime of financial market implies the absence of investors’ 
herding in the debt purchases. Thus this regime allows for capital owned by investors in amounts returning 
probability of a crisis being strictly less than unity. The crisis under these conditions could be associated with 
the market correction. 
Otherwise, a hectic financial activity that is going on along unbounded credit expansion could be transformed 
by herding into autocatalytic process that, if being subject to accumulation of a new debt, might drive the entire 
system at a total collapse. From a financial point of view, this systemic collapse appears to be a natural result 
of unbounded credit expansion which is ‘supported’ with the zero real resources. Since the wealth of investors, 
as a whole, becomes nothing but the ‘fool’s gold’, financial process becomes a singular one, and the entire 
system collapses. In particular, three phases of investors’ behavior - hedge finance, speculation, and the Ponzi 
game – investigated and defined by H. Minsky, could be easily identified in the model as a sequence of sub-
cycles  that unwound ultimately in the total collapse.  
Basic structure of a financial market 
As stated above, financial markets as a whole operated initially under a “normal” regime. By this term we mean 
markets dominated by rational investors buying and selling bonds and money. In a simple deterministic context, 
the total value of financial assets, 𝐴(𝑡),  could be defined as a simple Keynesian two-component structure. 
Hence, at any time, 𝑡, it is equal to the sum of money, 𝑀(𝑡) , and  the expected value of debt, 𝐵(𝑡): 
(1)      𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑀(𝑡) + 𝐵(𝑡). 
Each variable in equation (1) is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable function of time. For any 
infinitesimally short period borrowers in aggregate are to service their debt at the market (risk-adjusted) rate of 
return, 𝜇, subject to equation 𝑑𝐴 = 𝜇 𝐵 𝑑𝑡. In order to do that, all the creditors, in aggregate, are to receive 
their periodical (coupon) income,𝑚(𝑡)𝑑𝑡, and acquire new debt, 𝑑𝐵. Since money does not earn revenue, the 
general creditor-borrower balance corresponds to the following differential equation: 
(2)    𝜇 𝐵(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑚(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝐵.  
Given initial debt value, 𝐵(0), and a constant parameter 𝜇 ,  equation (2) can be easily solved as 
    (3)      𝐵(𝑡) = 𝐵(0) exp[ 𝜇 𝑡] − ∫ 𝑚(𝑢) exp[−𝜇(𝑢 − 𝑡)] 𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
. 
The debt value, as given by (3), may increase unboundedly in time. On the other hand, if at some future date, 
𝑡 = 𝑡∗, debt is to be redeemed, 𝐵(𝑡∗) = 0,  its current value should equal to  
    (4)    𝐵(0) = exp[ 𝜇 𝑡] ∗ ∫ 𝑚(𝑢) exp[−𝜇 𝑢] 𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
, 
which, for a continuous flow of constant coupon payments, is a representation of simple annuity: 
   (4’)  𝐵(0) =
m
μ
(1 − exp[−𝜇𝑡]). 
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In the following the expected debt value is considered to be twice differentiable function, 𝐵(𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) = 𝐵(𝑠𝑡),   of 
money issuance (money density at any moment of time, 𝑠𝑡).  There are two aspects to be explained within such 
an assertion. On the one hand, the debt value dependence upon money issuance, 𝐵(𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) = 𝐵(𝑠𝑡), by  making 
the debt maturity profile irrelevant, greatly simplifies the model.  
Secondly, from the economic point of view, the study of a debt value dependence upon money has a long 
scientific tradition that could be traced back at least centuries ago, especially, if being associated with the  
Austrian School of Thought. The latter established, rather firmly and persuasively, the causal links between 
money and debt by assembling a huge body of information, mainly of anecdotal character, about the excess 
money as precursors of the extreme economic events like debt overvaluation and financial bubbles. 
Historically, money excesses were always major cause to many extreme economic phenomena, ranging from 
the Tulipmania to the Great Depression. For example, a sudden rage for tulips in 17th century Holland, when a 
tulip bulb was worth more than a large mansion, is a well known fact. Though such a rage should had been 
supported with money, it was less known that the excessive issuance of florins in the period prior to the crisis 
had been the real factor that caused the tulipmania crash later (French, 2009).  The credit crunch of 2007-09 
could be analyzed along the same lines, for the excess liquidity, having been formed on global markets, gave 
rise to a subsequent credit meltdown.  
Though not unanimously acknowledged, the “Austrian tradition” of  money-debt studies seems to be very 
convenient in modeling of financial processes. Pecunia pecuniam parere non potest (money cannot beget 
money). In the same way, the money-debt relation cannot be treated in a straightforward manner, in a sense 
that money begets debt. Anyway, the contrary is untrue, as well. Rather, money (money issuance in the model) 
forms conditions imposed upon financial markets. Applying a physical analogy of interrelations among the 
volume, pressure and temperature, it could be said that money or liquidity plays the role of a temperature on 
the financial markets. Similar to increases in the volume due to higher temperature (given pressure), the larger 
liquidity issuance would increase financial activity measured, for example, by the volume of contracts, and, as 
it well known, the latter forms the precise meaning of the notion of liquid market.  
Due to uncertainty prevalent on financial and real markets, it is necessary to treat debt dynamics as a random 
process. The factor of uncertainty in the model is taken into account in the simplest possible way. Namely, the 
total debt value is assumed to evolve according to the following stochastic equation: 
(5)   𝑑𝐵 = [ 𝜇𝐵(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑠𝑡]𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐵(𝑠𝑡)𝑑𝑧𝑡, 
which is a biased geometric Brownian motion that is used as a standard tool in financial modeling. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stochastic money issuance 
The issuance of money (monetary base) is viewed in the model as an exclusive prerogative of a central bank 
which issues money stochastically due to uncertainty prevailing in the financial and real markets. Figure 1 
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shows the weighted index of market liquidity (Gieve, 2006) whose changes in time resemble a standard 
stochastic process.  Very similar performance is demonstrated on Figure 2 which represents dynamics of the 
currency component of the U.S. money supply. 
Money issuance is supposed to be a random process depending upon time 𝑡, 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑡. Due to decomposition into 
deterministic and stochastic components, the rate of money issuance could be represented as a geometric 
Brownian motion: 
(6)      
𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑡
= 𝑎 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧𝑡    
where 𝑎 > 0 is a positive drift and  𝜎 > 0 is a volatility parameter. Stochastic differential equation (6) can be 
solved along the standard procedure that gives rise to the following random process for money issuance: 
(7)   𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠0exp [(𝑎 − 0.5𝜎
2)𝑡 + 𝜎𝑧𝑡] 
where the term 𝑧𝑡 = ∫ 𝑑𝑧𝑢
𝑡
0
  is the Ito integral of a random noise.  Meanwhile, the nonrandom function 
     (8)   〈𝑠𝑡〉 = 𝑠0exp [𝑎𝑡] 
is used as a representation of the expected money issuance for a period 𝑡. 
 
Figure 1. The weighted index of market liquidity measures for 1992-2006. 
The monetary policy - quantitative easing, QE, for example - is performed by the central bank in accordance 
with (7) subject to a stochastic noise due to uncertainty prevalent on financial and real markets. Market 
participants expect money issuance in amounts given by nonrandom function (8). In accordance with the logic 
described above, financial investors, due to money issuance, acquire new debt persistently in a random fashion. 
In the micro-finance modeling money is usually considered to be a riskless  asset which pay out zero rate of 
interest (Farmer, 2000). On the macrolevel money issuance is evidently a stochastic process. For example, the 
most popular “game of a town” among investors is the prediction of refinancing rates to be used in a subsequent 
period by relevant central banks. The conflict between these two approaches does not show up, since, firstly, 
private investors monitor averaged amounts of money and, second, they hedge risks out of their portfolios. 
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Hence the assumption of riskless money is realized indirectly:  all the model variables appear to be intertwined 
deterministically though money issuance behaves as a random process.   
Generally, volatilities of debt and liquidity processes in (5) and (6) are different but this technical detail is 
avoided for the moment. The debt value (5) and the liquidity dynamics (6) equations are augmented by standard 
connections among the major rates of return. By definition, the risk-adjusted rate of return,  𝜇, on financial 
(debt) assets is equal to the sum of the current yield, 𝛿 =
𝑚
𝐵
, and the rate of capital appreciation (loss), 𝑎 =
𝑑𝐵
𝐵
: 
(9)   𝜇 = 𝛿 + 𝑎. 
 
Figure 2. Monthly changes in currency component of U.S. money supply. 
On the other hand, as it is known from the CAPM theory,  the same  risk-adjusted rate of return might be 
decomposed into the sum of  riskless rate, 𝑟 , and risk premium, 𝜆 𝜎 ∶ 
(10)   𝜇 = 𝑟 + 𝜆𝜎  
where   𝜆  is a unit risk price. From (9) and (10) it follows that difference between riskless rate and current yield 
is equal to the difference between capital gain and market value of risk: 
(11)   𝑟 − 𝛿 = 𝑎 − 𝜆 𝜎 , 
which will be used later. Altogether,  equations (5-6) and (9-10) form basic structure of the stochastic money 
– debt model. These equations will be solved in the subsequent paragraphs in order to get simple functions of 
expected debt and new debt. 
 
Investors’ motivation: expected and market debt 
Debt, in the model, is assumed to have three different valuations simultaneously. The nominal debt value, 𝐹, 
is considered to be constant, being fully collaterized by real resources. The phenomenon of the complete debt 
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collaterization by real resources takes place until some (critical) point of money issuance. On this interval the 
debt par measures the connectedness of financial and the real economic systems. On the other hand, the par 
debt, if being fully redeemed, is a measure of a riskless debt. The latter, as it will be shown later, is equal to the 
sum of its market value and the value of guarantees of financial stability by the society on behalf of the 
government and the central bank. Next, the market debt, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), is assumed to be dependent upon money 
issuance, hence it is a risky one, with value being determined by the market forces of supply and demand. 
Market debt, quite naturally, cannot exceed its par value, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) ≤ F. Contrary to that, the expected debt, 𝐵(𝑠𝑡), 
might take any value - larger, smaller or equal - to the par. It is treated by investors as perpetuity and depends 
upon liquidity issuance. This assumption, being   justified by the fact that debt as a whole was  never fully 
redeemed, simplifies all the model calculations.  
The market debt value, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡),  was supposed to have characteristics of an interest rate structurized product  
similar to a callable bond, or to  its modern analogue – the exchange-traded note, ETN6.  Remember that a non-
callable bond could be decomposed into a callable bond and an embedded option to call the bond back were 
the issuer to consider such an operation to be profitable (it is, usually, when interest rates are going to decrease):  
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
which reflects the fact that a callable bond has a smaller value to investors than a non-callable one (Levinson, 
2010). Since investors have the right, but not obligation, to acquire new debt, the expected debt could be treated 
as an exercised callable bond which loses its callable feature: 
𝐵(𝑠𝑡) =  𝐷(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑓(𝑠𝑡) 
The investors’ possibility to acquire new debt is represented (see Figure 3) in the model as an option to purchase 
new debt or a plain-vanilla call option: 
(12)      𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = [𝐵(𝑠𝑡) − 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), 0]
+, 
being written on the expected debt value 𝐵(𝑠𝑡) with  𝐷(𝑠𝑡)  as a strike price
7. Quite naturally, intentions of 
investors to purchase new debt might be realized only, if they do possess of some amount of liquidity. Hence 
function 𝑓(𝑠𝑡) might have an important interpretation as an amount of credit available. The latter represents 
the credit amount as a result of the commercial banks activity that should be added to monetary base issued by 
the central bank in a manner analogous to calculation of money aggregates. The value of an option  𝑓(𝑠𝑡), 
being exercised, would represent the value of a new debt. 
                                                          
6 The relatively new financial instrument – Exchange Traded Note – is a debt instrument invented by Barclay’s Bank in 
2006 (Wright et al, 2009). 
7 A callable bond ought to have a larger coupon and yield than the regular bond. For example, when the regular bond is 
$7
0.07
= $100 it might be either 
$9
0.09
  or  
$8
0.08
. This example shows that the market value of a callable debt, depending upon 
its coupon differs from the ordinary one. 
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Figure 3. Matured option to purchase new debt. 
The upfront option premium might be zero or very small. Usually buyers exercise their option to purchase new 
debt if its expected value exceeds the par, and do nothing otherwise. For example, anticipating increase in 
liquidity due to the central bank “easy money” policy they would reasonably try to benefit from interest rates 
decreases that make the expected debt larger than its par value. This pattern is formed by the typical behavior 
of investors who expect decreasing interest rates in the future or would perform the “flight to quality” under 
market distress and “quantitative easing”.  Since investors are not obligatory to make purchases, they could 
refuse to buy new debt in the case of interest rates increases. The above said assumption makes total debt 
similar to a callable bond. Hence their right to buy and increase their debt holdings should be embedded into 
the debt value, thus making rational investors to consider its expected value generally to be larger than the par.  
For any market value of a debt, its expected value being stripped of the option to buy new debt becomes a 
simple structurized product of a following form: 
 (13)  𝐵(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐷(𝑠𝑡)+[𝐵(𝑠𝑡) − 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), 0]
+. 
Evidently, equation (13) in terms of liquidity issuance represents behavior of a rational investor that hinges 
around the expected interest rates as was depicted in (Keynes, 1936). 
Investors’ motivation: the par and market debt 
On the other hand, bond holders are concerned with the possibility of losses due to increasing interest rates, 
and, as financial analysis demonstrates, these losses are, usually, higher the smaller money issuance. By 
anticipating stochastic money flows in the future, bond holders could protect their wealth by acquiring various 
debt guarantees that are widely traded in financial markets. The major part of  such guarantees in the modern 
financial systems are provided by the central bank which gives investors the free access to loans  in the periods 
of financial distress, as well as by the state system of deposit insurance. It should be noted that while today’s 
traditional banking system was made safe through the deposit insurance and liquidity provisions provided by 
the public sector, the shadow banking system – prior to the onset of the financial crisis of 2007-09 – was 
presumed to be safe due to liquidity and credit guarantees provided by the private sector. 
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These guarantees8, being combined, form the so called put-to-default option (Poszar et al, 2010) that might be 
defined as  
(14)    𝑃(𝑠𝑡) = [𝐹 − 𝐵(𝑠𝑡), 0]
+. 
Looking from this angle, the debt market value, again, becomes a simple structurized product of the following 
form: 
 (15)      𝐷(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐹 − [𝐹 − 𝐵(𝑠𝑡), 0]
+. 
Since put and call options have the same strike price (and maturity profile) equations (14) and (16), being taken 
together, would describe investors’ behavior via the “chooser” option which allows them to benefit from the 
large changes in the debt value. Being combined, these equations brought about the market value of aggregate 
debt, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) (see Figure 4) that satisfies the following condition:  
(16)    𝐵(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐹 − 𝑃(𝑠𝑡). 
Equation (16) is nothing more than the model representation of the put-call equivalence theorem. It is fulfilled 
for any amount of money issuance in such a way that by increasing monetary base, the central bank supports 
the larger amounts of the credit available but, due to (17) that stochastic process is followed by the appropriate 
decrease of put-to-default option. Thus the financial system as a whole gradually, though randomly, evolves 
towards the state that could be described as a shadow banking system. The latter is associated with a very 
loosely regulated trading of financial instruments by independent investors. Their trading activity is not 
supported or insured since the put-to-default guarantees are substituted for larger amounts of liquidity available 
for different market participants. Inherently, such a system absorbs more risks than the conventional system of 
financial intermediation. 
Assets and liabilities 
For the debt-money financial system, evidently, the sum of par and the new debt is equal to assets hold in the 
system. For maturing option contracts it is easy to show that, by adding and subtracting both put and call values 
from r.h.s. and l.h.s. of equalities (16), a following expression for the total financial assets, 𝐴(𝑠𝑡), would 
emerge: 
(17)   𝐵(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑃(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐴(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠𝑡). 
Next, by subtracting (16) from (17) due to the basic accounting equation:  
(18)   𝐴(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) + 𝐸(𝑠𝑡), 
it is possible to get a following definition of the total capital (equity) value: 
(19)   𝐸(𝑠𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑃(𝑠𝑡), 
where  𝐸(𝑠𝑡) is the value of the owner’s capital for financial system as a whole. Note, that due to the definition 
of the debt purchase option (12),   the equity in the system (19) is different from its analogue in the well-known 
Merton model. Equation (19) implies that options, even not being exercised, do have positive value due to some 
additional abilities of investors provided by the well developed financial system. These   possibilities are 
                                                          
8  On the microfinancial level this option is analogous to the Merton put-to-default option (Merton, 1992).  
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responsible for the Pigou effects upon the total wealth that might have disastrous consequences, if being 
exaggerated. 
 
Figure 4. Market value of a debt at options maturity. 
Next step in the model construction is to get a simple nonrandom representation of a debt as a function of 
money issuance.  
The expected debt valuation 
In an uncertain financial market the aggregate debt is evolved stochastically due to random liquidity dynamics. 
Thus, transforming the debt infinitesimal change by applying the Ito lemma and substituting equation (6)  into 
its expansion, we get the following stochastic equation:  
(20)   𝑑𝐵 = [𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐵
′(𝑠𝑡) + 0.5𝜎
2𝑠𝑡
2𝐵′′(𝑠𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑠𝑡𝐵
′(𝑠𝑡)𝑑𝑧𝑡 
where debt derivatives exist for they are being taken with respect to liquidity issuance 𝑠𝑡 . Coefficients of 
deterministic and random components in equations (5) and (20) could be equated, respectively, thus forming 
the following pairs: 
(21)   𝜇𝐵(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑠𝑡 =  𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐵
′(𝑠𝑡) + 0.5𝜎
2𝑠𝑡
2𝐵′′(𝑠𝑡) 
(22)            𝜎𝐵(𝑠𝑡) =  𝜎𝑠𝑡𝐵
′(𝑠𝑡). 
Via simple algebraic manipulations using (11), equations (21) and (22) could be transformed into the following 
inhomogeneous differential equation with respect to the debt function  𝐵(𝑠𝑡) : 
(23)  0.5𝜎2𝑠𝑡
2𝐵(𝑠𝑡)
′′ + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝑠𝑡𝐵(𝑠𝑡)
′ − 𝑟𝐵(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑠𝑡 = 0 . 
This second order equation is an ordinary analogue of the well known Black-Sholes partial differential 
equation, hence it has a much simpler, and intuitively understandable, solution (Dixit, Pindyck,1994). The 
solution to  the homogeneous part of (23) could be found as a linear combination of power functions 𝐵(𝑠) =
𝐵𝑠𝛽 , while its inhomogeneous part has a solution as a linear function of money issuance, 
1
𝛿
𝑠𝑡. Hence the 
expected debt function,  𝐵(𝑠𝑡)  , has  the following representation: 
(24)     𝐵(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐵1𝑠𝑡
𝛽1 + 𝐵2𝑠𝑡
𝛽2 +
1
𝛿
𝑠𝑡, 
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where   𝛽1 < 0 and  𝛽2 > 1 are the real and distinct roots of a characteristic equation: 
(25)    0.5𝜎2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 
that corresponds to the homogeneous part of (23). Since   𝛽1 < 0 the first component of solution (24) for the 
very small money issuance goes to infinity. Hence, in order to preserve the economic sense of solution, the 
constant 𝐵1 in (24) should be chosen as zero. This is so called “the absorption” condition requiring zero debt 
value in the absence of money issuance: its violation would lead to the unlimited debt growth that should be 
excluded from the model. The second constant in (24) is taken as zero, 𝐵2 = 0, in accordance with the 
assumption of a debt as a never fully redeemed bond, or the perpetuity. Hence the expected debt value, 𝐵(𝑠𝑡), 
becomes the particular solution to equation (23) of the following form: 
(27)     𝐵(𝑠𝑡) =
1
𝛿
𝑠𝑡. 
As it follows from (27), the expected debt value is just the perpetual (capitalized) future stream of coupon 
payments being discounted by the current yield   𝛿. It should be noted that an anticipation of money growth 
makes rational investors to be complacent with the current yield, 𝛿, in spite of the fact, that it is smaller than 
the risk adjusted rate,  𝜇. This feature of the bond value (27) becomes evident after taking expectation of the 
random money issuance:  
(28)  𝐵0 ≡ 〈𝐵0〉 = ∫ 〈𝑠𝑡〉 exp(−𝜇 𝑡) 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑠0 ∫ exp[−(𝜇 − 𝑎)] 𝑑𝑡 =
1
𝛿
𝑠0
∞
0
∞
0
. 
According to (28), while investors do anticipate increases in the future money issuance, they should use 
precisely the risk adjusted rate, 𝜇, in order to discount flow of future payments properly. Hence evaluating (at 
point   𝑡 = 0) the conditional expectation of the debt value brings about the same formula as in (27), assuming 
that, in the model, investors would consider the expected debt value as a simple perpetuity. For the financial 
system as a whole such an assumption does not contradict to the reality since the total debt (both public and 
private) should not be redeemed fully, contrary to individual debt of any single participant of the market. The 
total debt, being combined with anticipated future flow of liquidity, constitutes, as it appears, the persistent 
process of debt assets overvaluation that is known as “large asset price deviation”.  At the critical point of 
money issuance the asset price divergence reaches its maximum, as it will be shown later. 
Investors’ new debt portfolio 
In the model financial investors combine their decisions to buy the new and guarantee the existing debt. Thus 
their decisions are of hedging type, and it is assumed that the dominant group of investors is able to perform 
such an operation. In other words, under the normal regime any quantity of risk sellers would meet market 
participants taking the opposite position.  
Let the incremental portfolio, Φ(𝑠𝑡) , consisting of money issuance and new debt, be represented as follows: 
(29)   Φ(𝑠𝑡) = 𝜃1𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑓(𝑠𝑡), 
where 𝜃1, 𝜃2 are the constant weights of new money and new debt, respectively. Since the new debt could be 
acquired due to credit, function 𝑓(𝑠𝑡) represents the amount of credit available to investors. This incremental 
portfolio could be made riskless, if investors are to choose special values of constants, namely,  𝜃1 = −𝑓(𝑠𝑡)
′  
and  𝜃2 = 1.  With these weights, and due to equation of random money issuance (6), infinitesimal change 𝑑Φ 
to the incremental portfolio (29) becomes riskless:  
20 
 
         (30)   𝑑Φ̃(𝑠𝑡) = 0.5𝜎
2𝑠𝑡
2𝑓′′(𝑠𝑡)𝑑𝑡. 
For the shortest period of time 𝑑𝑡 the return on portfolio (29) could be made riskless, if the hedged portfolio 
return is adjusted with the convenience yield of money, 𝜃1𝛿 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑡, lost due to hedging. This requirement gives 
rise to the following equation: 
       (31)   𝑟[𝜃1𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑓(𝑠𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 = 0.5𝜎
2𝑠𝑡
2𝑓′′(𝑠𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃1𝛿 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑡 . 
Condition (31), modified by using the hedging values of constants and dividing through by 𝑑𝑡, could be reduced 
to the following equation for the riskless portfolio held by investors: 
(32)     0.5𝜎2𝑠𝑡
2𝑓′′(𝑠𝑡) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝑠𝑡𝑓
′(𝑠𝑡) −  𝑟𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 0 . 
The important and rather unexpected result of these transformations is that the “new debt”, or the credit, 
equation (32) has the same parameters (hence the same characteristic equation) as the homogeneous part of the 
debt value equation (23). Thus, by performing the same procedures of its solving, we get the value of an option 
to buy new debt as a function:  
(33)     𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐾1𝑠𝑡
𝛽1 + 𝐾2𝑠𝑡
𝛽2 . 
Due to the absorption condition the first constant in the r.h.s. of (33) has to be zero. Hence the option to purchase 
new debt (33) becomes the power function of a random liquidity   𝑠𝑡 : 
(34)    𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐾𝑠𝑡
𝛽
 
where 𝐾 ≡ 𝐾1 > 0, 𝛽 ≡ 𝛽1 > 1. Note that the value of the credit expansion is unrestricted. Hence mild credit 
issuance posits no problems (in the short run) but a persistent and unbounded credit expansion could create 
financial bubbles and crises.  
Since, under the normal conditions, the call option should be exercised “in the money”, investors, quite 
naturally, are motivated by the desire to maximize its value.  That could be done if money issuance goes along 
the lines of   “easy money” policy of the central bank. Such a policy, or the “quantitative easing, QE, in the 
modern parlance, facilitates important changes in the market structure.  
“Large asset prices deviation” at the critical point 
The doctrine of the “large asset prices deviation” forms foundations of studying of the modern financial system 
(Rajan, 2005). The phenomenon of divergence market prices from fundamental value of assets could emerge 
in the model when investors, while continuing their strife for profit maximization, switch their orientation en 
masse from monitoring the market, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), to the expected debt value, 𝐵(𝑠𝑡).  In economic terms, such a 
behaviour of market participants might be described as follows.  
The central bank, in a conduct of   “easy money” (or the quantitative easing) policy, issues money according 
to (6) thus changing its quantity circulated in the system. Additional liquidity pumping by the bank into 
financial markets is anticipated by investors according to (8). Since, under the circumstances, interest rates are 
expected to decrease, investors are doing their best to benefit from the higher debt value. Hence, in accordance 
with (13), they buy new debt thus forming greater demand for it. The latter gives rise to a persistent asset price 
growth along (27). Adjusting to the changing environment, investors continuously rebalance their portfolios by 
eliminating money - major source of uncertainty - from their incremental portfolios (29). Investors exercise 
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their options and maximize their value in order to buy new debt. Meanwhile, along with the easy money policy 
debt guarantees are going down due to increasing money issuance. Since maximization of the value of new 
debt purchases is supported by money issuance, investors’ purchases of new debt are going on in the atmosphere 
of a widespread optimism.  Asset prices are going up persistently and growing asset prices are “financial 
narcotics”, as W. Baffett once said. All the features described above, appear to be typical characteristics of a 
growing financial bubble that is being formed by divergence of market prices from the value of financial assets.  
Additional purchases of a new debt are induced by the liquidity increases up to its critical level at 𝑠 = 𝑠∗, where 
asset price divergence reaches its maximum. It is impossible to estimate this point by standard methods, 
however. For example, the straightforward attempt to solve equation  𝐷(𝑠∗) = 𝐹 , upon substitution of  
functions (27) and (34)  into this single equation, reveals two unknown parameters: 𝐾, 𝑠∗.  Hence, in order to 
find the critical money issuance, the latter should be represented as a “trivial” solution to the dynamic 
programming problem (Dixit, Pindyck, 1998) in which the second order differential equation (32) has to be 
complemented with three boundary conditions. The boundary conditions include the initial value condition, 
𝑓(0) = 0, together with the value-matching condition: 
(32)      𝑓(𝑠∗) = 𝐵(𝑠∗) − 𝐹, 
and the smooth-pasting condition (in derivatives with respect to random variable 𝑠𝑡): 
(33)     𝑓(𝑠∗)′ = 𝐵(𝑠∗)′. 
 
 
Figure 5. Value of the debt protection. 
Upon substitution of the expected debt value (27) and the new debt value (34) into equations (35) and (36), 
point  𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠
∗ could be easily found as the following quantity: 
(34)       𝑠∗ =
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝛿𝐹. 
Money issuance at the free boundary point simultaneously maximizes the expected debt value, 𝐵(𝑠), which 
increases up to  the amount of 
(35)        𝐵(𝑠∗) =
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝐹. 
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Thus, at the critical point 𝑠 = 𝑠∗ of money issuance the central bank policy helps investors to deliver maximum 
value to the new debt, hence the debt value itself. It is evident from the put-call equivalence theorem (17) that 
it is possible if the put-to-default value would reach zero, 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0, while the market value of debt reaches 
its nominal value, 𝐷(𝑠∗) = 𝐹.   
The debt purchase option, 𝑓(𝑠∗) at the critical point appears to be “in the money” which suggests that it could 
be exercised. Whether it is exercised or not, depends, however, upon the broad market conditions that mark the 
important qualitative changes underwent in the system: at the critical point social guarantees of the market 
stability become substituted for the credit availability and their disappearance opens way to further market 
metamorphosis. 
 Margin account iPath ETN 
𝐹 Own capital Closing indicative note value 
𝑓(𝑠∗) Borrowing “on margin” The-then current financing level 
𝐵(𝑠∗) The equity position The long index amount 
 
The Table given above represents an  interesting analogue between the debt structure at the critical point and 
the value of  iPath ETN – structurized debt instrument invented by the Barclays Bank in 2006 (iPath, 2007). 
The analogy is based upon the technique of borrowing “on margin” which helps an  investor to increase her/his 
long position beyond what can be established with the cash currently available within his/her account. For 
example, assuming we have such an instrument, then 𝐵(𝑠∗) could be associated with the long index amount, 𝐹 
– with the CINV (closing indicative note value), and 𝑓(𝑠∗) - with the financing level. The analogy, discerned 
above, might be helpful, in our view, in the further studying of systemic characteristics of financial markets via 
analysis of their actual performance. 
 
Figure 6. Bubble in the U.S. stock market. 
Critical point without herding 
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To purchase new debt investors in aggregate have to spend their money hence converting the amount of credit 
available into new debt. Their demand supports the growing price of new debt thus inducing investors to 
substitute the market debt value for its expected value. The coherent actions of investors generate en masse the 
process of a persistent debt overvaluation. It follows from (16) that the expected debt exceeds its market value 
for any positive call option. Hence at the critical point 𝑠 = 𝑠∗ the expected debt value increases at the rate of 
(36)    
𝐵(𝑠∗)
𝐷(𝑠∗)
=
𝛽
𝛽−1
> 1, 
which reflects the scale of the asset prices divergence at the critical point. Its magnitude corresponds to a short 
run Pigou effect of the total wealth increases under the normal regime of  financial market. It should be noted 
that under some conditions this effect might be totally spurious, thus incurring losses of investors’ wealth in 
the time of crisis.  
Under “normal” conditions, as it follows from (17), the total assets value at the point   𝑠∗  is equal to:  
(37)      𝐴(𝑠∗) = 𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠∗),  
since, by definition, the market debt value at the critical point equals to its nominal value, 𝐷(𝑠∗) = 𝐹.  What is 
the amount of financial equity in the system at the critical point? The answer depends whether at this point 
investors exercise the call option or not. In its turn, these actions are determined by the process of their herding, 
in other words, to what extend their behavior becomes irrational thus depriving them of the capability to make 
rational assessments and impose self-restrictions upon their behaviour.  
If at the critical point of liquidity issuance  𝑠∗ no herding takes place, the market participants behave under the 
prevalence of rational motives. Rational investors would abstain from exercising their call option since their 
own capital would disappear in that case. Thus the motive of preservation of their own capital would mean that: 
(38)    𝐸(𝑠∗) = 𝐴(𝑠∗) −  𝐷(𝑠∗) =
1
𝛿
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝛿𝐹 − 𝐹 =
1
𝛽−1
𝐹 =  𝑓(𝑠∗) > 0.  
Equation (35) implies that investors while maximizing the amount of the new debt continue to evaluate their 
risks rationally, in other words, they are cautious enough as to keep part of their wealth as their own capital, 
𝐸(𝑠∗) . Consequently, under the “no herding” condition due to accumulation of equity by the market 
participants, the “distance-to-default” magnitude, or the “system survival” probability, at the critical point 
would amount to the quantity: 
(39)   Pr[𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 ≡ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡] =
𝐴(𝑠∗ )−𝐷(𝑠∗ )
𝐴(𝑠∗)
= 1 −
𝛽−1
𝛽
=
1
𝛽
. 
Alternatively, without herding of the debt purchasers, the probability of financial default, however large, would 
be strictly less than unity: 
(40)  0 < 𝑃𝑟[𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡] =
𝐷(𝑠∗)
𝐴(𝑠∗)  
< 1. 
Since, by definition, Pr[𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡] = 1 − Pr [𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙], the default probability in the case of no herding is 
equal to the quantity:  
(41)   Pr[𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡] =
𝛽−1
𝛽
. 
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Such a scenario was investigated in (Smirnov, 2005) as a preferable, though not realized in practice, outcome 
of the government debt collapse in Russia in August 1998. It should be noted that coherent behavior of investors 
hedging simultaneously their portfolios, though being an optimal one, might bring about some unexpected 
consequences to the market performance. As (Chan et al, 2005) pointed out, the 1998 default on Russian 
government debt induced dramatic increases in market correlations.  Instead of being negligibly small, as in 
normal times, they turned to plus one virtually overnight. That phenomenon the authors termed as the “phase 
lock-in”. In other words, in the ongoing process of herding, the collective behavior of investors would bring 
about dramatic changes to the market leading ultimately to its collapse. This singular nature of herding might 
be captured, for example, via models of a percolation (Stauffer, 2001) or the chaotic behavior of financial 
investors (Ausloos et al, 2006) but these are different avenues of financial research that is not pursued in this 
paper. 
Herding at critical point 
The process of (irrational) herding in the model implies that every one of financial investors while maximizing 
the option to buy new debt, would substitute the market debt value, 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), for its expected value, 𝐵(𝑠𝑡). 
Increasing asset prices are followed by growing leverage, and this process was studied extensively, for example, 
in (Adrian and Shin, 2008). Though the scale of a bubble given by (32) is finite, it is easy to notice that the 
market leverage, 
𝐷(𝑠)
𝐸(𝑠)⁄  , is capable to grow indefinitely when 𝐸(𝑠) → 0  and 𝐴(𝑠
∗) = 𝐵(𝑠∗) . If, at the 
critical point, 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠
∗, the expected debt value becomes equal to the total assets value, then amount of capital 
in the system  diminishes virtually to the zero: 
(42)       𝐸(𝑠∗) = 𝐴(𝑠∗) − 𝐵(𝑠∗) = 0.  
As a direct consequence of such a development, financial leverage ratio  
(43)      
𝐴(𝑠∗)
𝐸(𝑠∗)
→ ∞, 
would theoretically, as shown in Figure 5, increase indefinitely at the critical point.   
 
Figure 7. Leverage singularity. 
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Hence the ongoing process of herding among investors implies that a posteriori  probability of default becomes 
equal to one: 
(47)      Pr  [𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡] =
𝐵(𝑠∗)
𝐴(𝑠∗)  
= 1 , 
that makes the occurrence of a financial crisis to be a virtually inevitable event. From the economic point of 
view, it might be concluded that persistent increasing of the money issuance (excess liquidity) coupled with 
herding would lead to the systemic collapse. The latter is the sudden and dramatic decline in asset prices that 
might take place at the once benign point of money issuance 𝑠 = 𝑠∗ were the herding features of investors 
behavior become pronounced enough to dominate the market. As it was stressed in (Rajan, 2005), “[the] 
prolonged deviations from fundamental value are possible because relatively few resources will be deployed 
to fight the herd”.  Unfortunately, few would want to go up against the trend that is originated by enormous 
mass of traders. Evidently, at the critical point investors trying desperately to get higher asset value are doomed 
to increase leverage as it had happened with investment banks on the eve of financial meltdown in 2007. Yet 
the collapse of the market at the critical point of money issuance, however probable, is not inevitable. The 
probability of a default at this point will be evaluated later, but now let us examine the system’s behavior if the 
default is happened to be avoided.  
Generally, origins of financial bubbles are hidden in the normal market since investors are allowed for the 
unrestricted exercising of their options that leads to a persistent substitution of the market debt value for its 
expected value.  The crisis might have happened either at the critical point (under the hypothesis of herding) or 
later, at the point of the total collapse.  Due to herding condition, the system might perform at the critical point 
dually. Without herding, investors would orient themselves around the market debt and prefer to accumulate 
own capital instead of new debt. These actions would decrease the probability of a default making it strictly 
less than unity. The herding process would have opposite consequences: to be consistent, investors are to use 
the expected, instead of the market, debt value as their guideline since the former serves as an adequate 
benchmark for the decision-making in a frenzy atmosphere of accelerating asset prices growth. Asset prices 
bifurcation at the Minsky point (to be discussed later) initiates the process of their divergence. At the critical 
point, where the price divergence reaches maximum, investors, all of a sudden, would realize that their own 
capital disappears while their assets are equal to the expected debt value. That awareness would have a 
devastating effect upon everybody’s confidence in a system: market participants start to sell en masse, asset 
prices drop dramatically, and the system collapses. A posteriori probability of a total default (crisis) becomes 
equal to one while financial leverage starts to grow indefinitely, and the system collapses. Repeat again, that 
this phenomenon would have taken place at the critical point with some non-zero probability of default, and on 
a much greater scale it almost surely takes place on a next phase at point  ?̃?.  
Total collapse of the system 
If the central bank does not change its policy of money issuance (quantitative easing, for example) but investors 
impose self-restrictions refraining to exercise their call option, then financial system continues to evolve 
towards a shadow banking system. It is ultimately losing touch with its basic purpose - to transfer resources 
from ineffective to their effective usage. Instead, financial markets become, to a large extent, venues of a pure 
speculative activity. The unbounded credit expansion is accompanied with deprivation of the real wealth. In H. 
Minsky’s parlance, the vast majority of investors become engaged in a Ponzi game facilitated by excess of 
money on a macrofinancial scale (Minsky, 2008). Remember that in the shadow banking system any 
counterparty is exposed to unprotected risks due to the absence of the put-to-default option. Ultimately, real 
resources serving as a collateral to financial assets, become negligible comparing with the huge amounts of 
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new (uncollaterized) debt. This important qualitative change of financial system is captured via decreasing of 
the debt collateral, 𝐹, after the critical point of money issuance, 𝑠∗, due to the hectic acquisition of new debts 
by investors including banking institutions, being involved into the so called the “Ponzi game”, using H. 
Minsky terminology. The Ponzi game of speculative activity goes on until the point 𝑠 = ?̃? where the market 
debt becomes completely worthless, 𝐷(?̃?) = 𝐹 = 0. At the point of money issuance,  𝑠 = ?̃?, the complete 
absence of social guarantees of financial stability, or the zero put-to-default option,  being combined with the 
worthless debt,  gives rise to the system singularity. The general equation of the put-call equivalence (16) 
reduces to 
(48)    𝐵(?̃?𝑡) − 𝑓(?̃?𝑡) = 0, 
meaning that the wealth of a nation becomes to consist of paper (or virtual) money only, uncollaterised by real 
resources. The wealth becomes completely worthless or the fool’s gold. Under the circumstances, the collapse 
of the entire currency system is the only outcome of such an evolution. It was well understood and persuasively 
explained by the Post-Keynesian School (H. Minsky), and, in this important aspect, is completely in agreement 
with the major assertions of the Austrian School (Hayek, 2008). It should be noted, though, that in one important 
aspect the model differs from the Austrian constructions: it does not predict “a major currency crisis coming 
soon” as in interview of the “Austrian” economist P. Schiff (cited in Krugman, 2012) or similar doomsday 
predictions. though the timing of the latter is firmly tied up with the amount of money issuance. 
As follows from the above said, different decisions of investors at the critical point of money issuance,  𝑠 = 𝑠∗, 
are able only to postpone the inevitable financial crash. The credit crunch in the model either, with probability 
𝑝 = 0.42, takes place at point  𝑠 = 𝑠∗ right away, or it comes later, at larger amount of money issuance, 𝑠 = ?̃?, 
and “this time is different”, indeed, since the probability of default is equal, invariably, to one. Thus, contrary 
to the soliloquy of Hamlet beginning with a famous assertion: “to be, or not to be, that is the question…”   the 
investors  dilemma, as formulated in the model  – to buy or not to buy (an additional debt) – turned out to be, 
in fact, an illusory one9. In other words, the crisis would come inevitably, though, since at the critical point 
investors are able to buy some time, it might come either sooner or later. Yet, there is no escape from this 
vicious cyclical path without cardinal changes in the monetary policy. In this vital aspect, a cyclical behavior 
of the model dynamics literally repeats a famous L. vonMises assertion that was cited in the epigraph 
(vonMises, 1996, p.572).  
Natural cycle of the credit expansion 
The model permits to calculate different probabilities of default that could have happened under various 
amounts of money issuance. Their estimation follows the general approach to the default probabilities 
calculation (Kasapis, 2010; Hull, 2011). As was said in section 5, at the point  ?̂?  the value of a riskless debt is 
equal, by definition, to its market value plus the value of social guarantees:  
𝐹 = 𝐷(?̂?) + 𝑃(?̂?). 
                                                          
9 “To be, or not to be, that is the question: 
Whether ‘tis Nobler in the mind to suffer 
The Slings and Arrows of outrageous Fortune, 
Or to take Arms against a Sea of Troubles…” 
William Shakespeare,  Hamlet, Act 3 scene 1 
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Since put-to-default option could be represented as 
(49)   𝑃(?̂?) = 𝑝(?̂?)𝐹 
where  𝑝(?̂?) is the probability of system’s default at that point. At this point probability to default is equal to  
(50)  𝑝(?̂?) = 1 −
𝐷(?̂?)
𝐹
  , 
while the par (riskless debt),  𝐹,could be expressed as 
(51)  𝐹 = 𝐷(?̂?)[1 − 𝑝(?̂?)]−1. 
Correspondingly, at the critical point 𝑠∗ since the debt value increases to 𝐵(𝑠∗) while at this amount it becomes 
risky, the following equation takes place 
(52)  𝐵(𝑠∗) = 𝐹 + 𝑝(𝑠∗)𝐵(𝑠∗). 
Thus the probability of default at the critical point is equal to 
(53)  𝑝(𝑠∗) = 1 −
𝐹
𝐵(𝑠∗)
. 
As it was said in the previous section, this probability a priory is strictly less than one, though it generally larger 
than default under the “normal” circumstances. It is easy to show that if  
  𝐷(?̂?) × 𝐵(𝑠∗) = 𝐹2 , 
then  𝑝(?̂?) = 𝑝(𝑠∗) = 𝑝 and the probability of default could be calculated as 
 (54)   𝑝 = 1 − 𝜔−0.5 ,  
where 𝜔 =
𝐵(𝑠∗)
𝐷(?̂?)
 is the index of the debt growth. This probability was proposed in and evaluated for the debts 
of the European banking system (Smirnov, 2012). 
Yet another important regularity in credit cycle might be discovered. The model shows that the longer credit 
expansion goes on, the higher becomes the probability of crisis: 
(55)       𝑝(?̂?) < 𝑝(𝑠∗) < 𝑝(?̃?). 
where, by definition, 𝑝(?̃?) = 1.0. This regularity could be called the natural credit expansion enequality. It 
follows directly from inequality 
 𝐷(?̂?) × 𝐵(𝑠∗) < 𝐹2 
 since we have to compare probabilities to default at points of monetary issuance ?̂? 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠∗.   
Interestingly enough, the footprints of the same idea could be found in a recent report of Bloomberg 
(Bloomberg, September 6, 2012). The news agency cited an essay of the London-based analytical firm SLJ 
Macro Partners LLP in which the authors, supposedly, came to the idea of “natural cycles” empirically, after a 
thorough analysis of the family of yield curves.  
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General structure of a credit cycle 
Possibility of excluding risks via hedging that helps to transform the system into a simple deterministic model, 
would open way to the analysis of a neatly formed structure of a financial cycle. First, deterministic behavior 
of a system along the money issuance axis reveals the existence of three, clearly distinguishable, points which 
define and separate qualitatively different regimes that would emerge in the process of money issuance. Second, 
critical points and different regimes of a market, in their turn, could be quite naturally identified as the Minsky 
phases of normal investing, speculation and Ponzi game (Minsky, 2008). Being studied along these lines, the 
model would demonstrate a striking similarity between sequential Minsky phases and a cyclical behavior of a 
financial system in the continuous process of credit expansion, as described by the Austrian School of Thought. 
The phased behavior of a financial system is represented in Table 1. Repeat again, that its simplicity is 
noticeable in terms of money issuance only, while as a variable of time it, most likely, would possess a 
multifractal structure. For example, the fact that in 2008 the Fed balance sheet was increased more than two-
fold (from $0.9 billion to $2.3 billion) for a period of time less than half a year, could have had an interpretation 
of a multifractal structure of a time variable: [0, ?̂?] → 𝑡1 ≫ 𝑡2 ← [𝑠
∗, ?̃?]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.    General structure of a credit cycle 
Money 
Issuance, 𝑠 
Debt Face 
Value, 𝐹 
Debt Expected 
Value,  𝐵(𝑠) 
Debt Market 
Value,  𝐷(𝑠) 
New Debt 
Value,  
𝑓(𝑠) 
Social 
Guarantees, 
𝑃(𝑠) 
[0, ?̂?) 𝐹 up up up down 
?̂? 𝐹 𝐵(?̂?) = 𝐹 𝐷(?̂?) > 0 𝑓(?̂?) = 𝑃(?̂?) 𝑃(?̂?) = 𝑓(?̂?) 
[?̂?, 𝑠∗) 𝐹 up up up down 
𝑠∗ 𝐹 =
= 𝐵(𝑠∗)
− 𝑓(𝑠∗) 
 
𝐵(𝑠∗)
= 𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠∗) 
𝐷(𝑠∗) = 𝐹 𝑓(𝑠∗)
= 𝐵(𝑠∗) − 𝐹 
𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0 
 
[𝑠∗, ?̃?) 𝐹 = 𝐷(𝑠) up down up 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0 
?̃? 𝐹 = 0 𝐵(?̃?) = 𝑓(?̃?) 𝐷(?̃?) = 0 𝑓(?̃?) = 𝐵(?̃?) 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0 
 
The Minsky phases are characterized, generally, by different roots of equation (16) which, for convenience, is 
reproduced here: 
𝐵(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐹 − 𝑃(𝑠𝑡). 
In terms of money issuance, 𝑠,  there exist three important critical points:  
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no-arbitrage or equilibrium point, ?̂? , where investors are indifferent whether to possess expected or par value 
of a debt, 𝐵(?̂?) = 𝐹. Their indifference is due to their ability to swap put-to-default option for new debt, or vice 
versa, 𝑓(?̂?) − 𝑃(?̂?) = 0; 
the second critical point, 𝑠∗,  where investors maximize the value of the acquired new debt, 𝑓(𝑠∗) = max
𝑠
𝑓(𝑠). 
Hence the equality appears: 𝐵(𝑠∗) = 𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠∗)  which takes place, if  𝐷(𝑠∗) = 𝐹,  𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0.  
total default (the crisis) point, ?̃?, where the face value of a debt is completely lost due to virtual disappearance 
of its real collateral, 𝐷(?̃?) = 𝐹 = 0. The latter takes place due to excessive un-collaterized borrowing by 
financial institutions. Under these circumstances investors’ wealth, consisting only of credit,  𝐵(?̃?) = 𝑓(?̃?) 
became, in fact, a fool’s gold, and the entire financial system is doomed to collapse.  
The normal regime of financial investing could be defined on the interval of money issuance 𝑠 ∈ [0, ?̂?]. Along 
this interval the central bank facilitates expansionary policy that is followed by increases in expected and the 
market value of a debt. Strictly speaking, financial calamities could have taken place within this semi-interval 
of money issuance, if social guarantees are absent or insufficient. Historically, something like that  had taken 
place in 1998 in Russia due to restrictions on its money issuance being imposed by the IMF (Smirnov, 1999). 
Such a possibility is reflected in the model via the probability of default which at this point, as it was shown, is 
strictly less than zero. 
The first signal of irreversible changes that are to happen in the system, might be discerned at the point  𝑠 = ?̂? 
where the expected debt value becomes equal to its collateral:  𝐵(?̂?) = 𝐹. At this point investors are prepared 
to make a swap between the option to buy new debt and the put-to-default option since  
𝑓(?̂?) − 𝑃(?̂?) = 0. 
After this point, the expansionary money policy of the central bank would motivate investors to exercise their 
option to buy new debt because its expected value becomes persistently larger than that of the put-to-default 
option. The expected debt being exercised loses its callable feature and persistently overvalues its market value. 
Hence the debt market value starts to diverge noticeably from its fundamental value. 
At the critical point, 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠
∗, financial system underwent its first major structural change: the market debt value 
reaches its maximum, 𝐷(𝑠∗) = 𝐹, bounded by its riskless amount, while the expected debt became maximal,  
𝐵(𝑠∗) = 𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠∗). This is possible, however, due to the zero value of the put-to-default option, 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0. 
Thus the normal regime comes to an end, reflecting the final stage of a gradual process of substitution of 
standard banking intermediation for the direct trading in financial instruments. Standard banking intermediation 
has finally transformed into the shadow banking system. At the critical point 𝑠∗,  the system may (or may not) 
come to a crisis with some non-zero probability. If the crisis is to take place at this point, it would be of a 
relatively small amplitude associated usually with the market correction. 
If the central bank does not change its policy of money issuance financial system continues to evolve as a 
shadow banking system. The unbounded credit expansion facilitates a Ponzi on a macrofinancial scale. The 
random liquidity issuance being coupled with herding produces a kind of   “irrational exuberance” among 
investors, and their collective behavior drives the system towards its total collapse. Ultimately, real resources 
serving as a collateral to financial assets, would become negligible in comparison with the enormous amount 
of a new, and uncollaterized, debt. Thus, at some point of money issuance,  𝑠 = ?̃?, a complete disappearance 
of social guarantees of a financial stability, being combined with the worthless debt, gives rise to the system 
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singularity. Under the circumstances, the collapse of the entire currency system might be conceived as the only 
outcome of a monetary evolution that, by definition, would take place with the unit probability of default. 
The excess of money accumulation 
The sum of money issuance and funds realized as a new debt value, 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑠𝑡), reflexes a trade-off between 
liquidity and returns that investors usually face on financial markets. Cash in the pocket is perfectly liquid but 
earns no return while investment into new debt promises some pay-off, if being successful, but not liquid. 
The system behavior at the critical point 𝑠 = 𝑠∗ is a very misleading one. Though it was shown previously that 
investors maximize their acquisition of a new debt, their actions are far from being the most important factor 
of the system transformation. Actually, at this point the system, as a whole, accumulates excessive cash, 𝑠, as 
the means of exchange opposite to loanable funds, 𝐵(𝑠) − 𝑠, and that means the formation of excessive money. 
Since mathematical structure of the model could have produced the entirely pervert impression about the system 
behavior, it is in need of some clarifications. For this purpose it would be helpful to compare investors’ 
acquisition of debts with the straightforward re-lending process. According to the standard re-lending model, 
at the point 𝑠𝑡 = ?̂? ,  the banking system’s assets, ?̂? + (1 − 𝛿)𝐹, and liabilities, 𝐹, would form a very simple 
configuration given by the following balance sheet:  
Assets Liabilities 
money (issuance),   ?̂? Value of riskless debt,   𝐹 
credit amount,     (1 − 𝛿)𝐹  
Total:                  𝐹 Total:                          𝐹 
 
which could be represented as a standard accounting equation: 
(56)     ?̂? + (1 − 𝛿)𝐹 = 𝐹    since       ?̂? = 𝛿𝐹. 
According to (56), financial ( banking)  system as a whole has assets consisting of money, ?̂?,  and credit, 
(1 − 𝛿)𝐹, while its liabilities are represented as riskless value, 𝐹, of  resources deposited by the  real system. 
In the linear re-lending process the money multiplier is given in by parameter   1 𝛿⁄ , namely, as amount of credit 
per unit of money issuance.  
The same configuration is repeated when the system arrives at point  𝑠∗: 
(57)    𝑠∗ + (1 − 𝛿)
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝐹 =
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝐹, 
with the only difference that when the system moved from point  ?̂? to point 𝑠∗, its liabilities, hence money 
issuance increased in proportion of 
𝛽
𝛽−1
.  
Assets Liabilities 
money (issuance),   𝑠∗ =
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝛿 𝐹 Value of expected debt,  
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝐹 
credit amount,     (1 − 𝛿)
𝛽
𝛽−1
 𝐹  
Total:                          𝐵(𝑠∗) Total:     𝐵(𝑠∗) 
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On the other hand, the new debt maximization forms the final configuration of a system at point  𝑠∗ , as 
following: 
(58)     𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠∗) = 𝐵(𝑠∗) ≡
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝐹. 
Assets Liabilities 
money (issuance),   𝑠∗ =
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝛿 𝐹 Value of riskless debt,  𝐹 
credit amount,     (1 − 𝛿)
𝛽
𝛽−1
 𝐹 Value of the new debt, 𝑓(𝑠∗) =
1
𝛽−1
 𝐹 
Total:                          𝐵(𝑠∗) Total:     𝐵(𝑠∗) 
 
Thus, as it follows from (57) and (58), the system as a whole accumulates excess money in the amount of   
(59)    (1 − 𝛿)
𝛽
𝛽−1
𝐹 − 𝑓(𝑠∗) = [(1 − 𝛿)𝛽 − 1]
𝐹
𝛽−1
. 
The huge amount of excess money facilitates the subsequent credit expansion leading to the ultimate collapse 
of the entire currency system. From the previous it follows that  inequality 
(60)       𝛽(1 − 𝛿) > 1 
quantifies the vonMises assertion taken as an epigraph to the paper. Since in the model, as it will be shown 
later, 𝛽 ≫ 1, it explains the phenomenon of the crisis inevitability and deserves to be named as   the vonMises 
inequality. 
Finally, in the phase of the Ponzi game, the financial system would accumulate debt in such enormous amount 
that would dwarf its real collateral. Hence the system configuration would become a totally biased one 
supposing its collapse at point  ?̃?. 
Assets Liabilities 
money (issuance),   ?̃?  
credit amount,    (
1
𝛿
− 1) ?̃? Value of the new debt, 𝑓(?̃?) 
Total:                          𝐵(?̃?) Total:     𝐵(?̃?) 
 
For the purpose of comparison on Figure 6 are given empirical data of excess liquidity in the eurozone banking 
system in 2009-11. 
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Figure 8. (From FT, January 31, 2011) 
Remember, that in the model money does not play in full its function as “means of payment”. It makes finance 
as a kind of a circular system, where debts are monetized within the system itself. To pursue such an approach, 
in spite of its artificial character, would seem to be helpful in understanding some prominent features of the 
modern finance. Namely, though the G4 economies central banks have dramatically increased their balance 
sheets, the impact of these actions upon the aggregate money demand was almost negligible. Thus, the excess 
money is doomed to lose its purchasing power which, if happens, would pave way towards the imminent 
collapse of the whole system.  
The Minsky point 
The concept of asset prices divergence implies the importance of discerning a bifurcation point between the 
trajectories of “normal” debt value given by function 𝐷(𝑠𝑡), and the overvalued debt trajectory of 𝐵(𝑠𝑡). This 
problem has an important real life equivalent associated with the early detection of a financial bubble. 
Economists debated this issue for a long time: it is enough to recall the critique of Greenspan’s policy by P. 
Krugman for its inability to prevent the bubble growth in the housing and credit markets (Krugman, 2008). The 
point of bifurcation deserves to be called ” the Minsky” point since it is the origin of all the subsequent troubles 
in the financial market10.  As learned from the history of finance, the failure to detect properly the Minsky point 
would have had ominous consequences for the market for the avalanche of debts becomes virtually irreversible 
after it has been passed.  
In the model, the asset price divergence becomes easily recognizable after the system passage through the point 
of bifurcation where the financial bubble emerges. It is reasonable to identify the Minsky point with intersection 
between either of trajectories 𝐷(𝑠𝑡) or  𝐵(𝑠𝑡)  with the trajectory of the put-to-default, 𝑃(𝑠𝑡). Before the point 
                                                          
10 In economic literature the “Minsky moment” is associated with the market meltdown (Cassidy, 2010). 
33 
 
of bifurcation 𝑠𝑚 the market or expected debt is fully guaranteed while it is not after. Thus, assuming the 
equality 
  𝐷(𝑠𝑚) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑚) 
takes place, the Minsky point 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠𝑚 could be found as the solution to  
(61)  𝐹 = 2 [𝐵(𝑠𝑚) − 𝑓(𝑠𝑚). 
On the other hand, for the condition 
 𝐵(𝑠𝑚) = 𝑃(𝑠𝑚) 
The Minsky point could be found as a solution to 
(62)  𝐹 + 𝑓(𝑠𝑚) = 2 𝐵(𝑠𝑚). 
Evidently, since the option to buy new debt is out of the money for the small liquidity issuance, the discrepancy 
between (61) and (62) would be rather small. 
Numerical primer 
The model described above could be illustrated numerically as follows. The system parametrization was based 
on a rather realistic figure of a nominal debt in 200 trillion of dollars, 𝐹 = $200𝑡𝑟, that roughly corresponds to 
the amount of world debt as given by the IMF (GFSR, 2011). The world liquidity was estimated in amount of 
$9.6 trillion that approximated the amount of the world monetary base. Rates of return in the model simulation 
were taken as follows: the riskless rate was about 5 percent, 𝑟 = 0.05, and annual risk-adjusted interest rate 
was equal to 7 percent, 𝜇 = 0.07, per annum. The latter, equivalently, is equal to the sum of current yield, 𝛿 =
0.045, and expected annual capital gain, 𝑎 = 0.025. The quantity of risks (per annum) in the system was 
measured by annual volatility, 𝜎 = 0.15, which  had  its price per unit, 𝜆 = 0.45.  
The characteristic equation of such a system: 
0.5 × 0.152𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + (0.05 − 0.045)𝛽 − 0.05 = 0 
has two distinct real roots: 𝛽1 = −0.099, and 𝛽2 = 2.404 > 1, of which only the positive root has an economic 
meaning. The graph of that characteristic equation is shown in Figure 9. It is interesting to note that financial 
process in the model is of a  fractal nature with the exponent being not too far from the so called “cubic law” 
(Lux, 2006).  
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Figure 9. Characteristic equation and its roots. 
The major characteristics of the system cyclical behavior are summarized in Table 2. Its entries were calculated 
using the appropriate formulas of the model.  
Table 2. (in trillion of dollars) 
Money 
Issuance,𝑠 
Market debt 
value, 𝐷(𝑠) 
Expected Debt 
Value, 𝐵(𝑠) 
New Debt 
Value,  𝑓(𝑠) 
Social 
Guarantees, 
𝑃(𝑠) 
Probability of 
Default 
?̂? = 9.0 161.0 200.0 39.0 39.0 0.195 
𝑠 = 12.4     0.315 
𝑠∗ = 15.5 200.0 342.9 142.9 0 0.417 
?̃? = 28.9 0 642.6 642.6 0 1.0 
 
For example, in our numerical primer the critical point of money issuance 𝑠∗  is equal to 
 𝑠∗ =
2.4
1.4
× 0.045 × 200 = $15.5 𝑡𝑟. 
This quantity defines the expected value of a debt at the critical point: 
 𝐵(𝑠∗) =
1
0.045
× 15.5 = $342.9 𝑡𝑟, 
and, correspondingly, the value of new debt: 
𝑓(𝑠∗) = 0.2 × 15.52.4 = $142.3 𝑡𝑟 
where constant 𝐾 = 0.2. Hence at the critical point  𝑠∗ = $15.5 𝑡𝑟 , the expected value of debt equals to 
$ 342.9 𝑡𝑟. The latter amount is the sum of the nominal debt $ 200 𝑡𝑟 plus new debt$ 142.9 𝑡𝑟 . 
The Minsky point, 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠𝑚  is defined by as the equality of debt guarantees to either the market or to the 
expected debt value. Hence this point is estimated as either $4.9 𝑡𝑟 or $4.7 𝑡𝑟 , respectively. Note, that starting 
at this point, rational behavior of investors becomes less rational since they follow the trajectory of the debt 
overvaluation. The rational motivation prevails until the point ?̂? after which it turns out into speculation. This 
process becomes autocatalytic (the Ponzi game in the Minsky terminology) after the critical point 𝑠∗, and 
eventually ends up at point ?̃?  in total crisis. The model reveals an important feature of a crisis situation at the 
critical point. Even if private investors due to self-imposed restrictions upon the new debt acquisition avoid the 
crisis, the central bank continues to increase liquidity further. Such a behavior, incidentally, is fully in line with 
the monetary policy of quantitative easing after the current financial meltdown. Autocatalitic character is 
reflected via the disappearance of the real collateral to the debt. Phases of speculation and the Ponzi game 
together form the emergence of a financial bubble that could burst either at the critical point  𝑠 = 𝑠∗  or, 
ultimately at ?̂?. The overall picture of a financial cycle is given in Figure 8. 
Table 3. Probabilities to default. 
                     Money issuance, 𝑠 ($ tr)                     Default probability, 𝑝(𝑠) 
9.0 0.195 
12.4 0.315 
15.5 0.417 
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28.9 1.0 
 
The numerical primer supports the idea of the “natural cycle” in terms of probabilities to default which are 
given in Table 3. Evidently, larger money issuance in the system leads to larger probability of its default. The 
invariant credit expansion in the model is doomed to end up in the total collapse of the entire monetary system 
that would take place with probability 1.0. 
 
Figure 10. The Minsky phases in finance. 
After the point of total collapse  ?̃?, the cycle would repeat itself. The next, “rational” phase of a cycle could be 
conceived as deleveraging along the lines of the debt-deflation spiral elaborated by I. Fisher (Fisher, 1933). 
The behavior of investors is very cautious after that painful period: they prefer to form and accumulate debt 
guarantees in the first place thus making safer the post-crisis system. Yet, as investors’ confidence gradually 
grows along the safer investment activity so would intensify their arrogance.  Phases of speculation and the 
Ponzi game are clearly discernible along the same lines as thoroughly studied by H. Minsky. Without the 
doomsday predictions the model outcome of a credit expansion conforms, in general, assertions of the Austrian 
School, too. 
A temporal view of a system 
The system singularity which is followed out of zero equity condition at the critical point, 𝐸(𝑠∗) = 0, might be 
deduced alternatively, via investors’ expectations. Remind, that according to equation (1) at any point of time 
the sum of expected values for money and debt is given by 
        (63)     〈𝐴(𝑡)〉 = 〈𝑀(𝑡)〉 + 〈𝐵(𝑡)〉 . 
The expected money aggregate, 〈𝑀(𝑡)〉, at time 𝑡 is equal, by definition, to 
         (64)    〈𝑀(𝑡)〉 = ∫ 〈𝑠𝑢〉𝑑𝑢 = ∫ 𝑠0 exp[𝑎 𝑢] 𝑑𝑢 =
𝑠0
𝑎
(exp[𝑎𝑡] − 1)
𝑡
0
𝑡
0
 
due to expected money issuance given by equation (8).  At the same time, by taking the expected debt value 
from (27) we get  
         (65)      〈𝐵(𝑡)〉 =
1
𝛿
〈𝑠𝑡〉 =
1
𝛿
𝑠0 exp[𝑎 𝑡].  
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Hence, by adding (64) and (65), the expected asset value at time 𝑡 becomes to be expressed as follows: 
         (66)    〈𝐴(𝑡)〉 =
𝑠0
𝑎
(
𝜇
𝛿
exp[𝑎𝑡] − 1). 
The time of a crisis as “time zero”, 𝑡∗ = 0 ,  would correspond to the critical point of money issuance, 𝑠∗ = 𝑠0,  
and the total asset value (66)  would equal to 
        (67)     〈𝐴(𝑡∗)〉 = 〈𝐴(𝑠∗)〉 = 〈𝐵(𝑠∗)〉. 
Hence, analysis of investors’ expectations leads to the same result as before:  the value of total assets at the 
critical point (due to herding) consists of expected debt only. As such, the result (67) would have suggested the 
ergodic character of financial processes, though this assertion is in need of the further exploration. 
Yet one more important comment should be made with regard to the “absolute” quantities of debt, money and 
value of total assets. Comparing equation (1) being evaluated at the time of a crisis  𝑡∗ = 0  
        (68)      〈𝐴(𝑡∗)〉 = 〈𝑀(𝑡∗)〉 + 〈𝐵(𝑡∗)〉   
with equation (17) evaluated at the critical point     𝑠 = 𝑠∗ 
        (69)         𝐴(𝑠∗) = 𝐵(𝑠∗) + 𝑃(𝑠∗) 
we have to conclude that  
         (70)      〈𝑀(𝑡∗)〉 = 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0   
since 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0 due to (35). Since total money aggregate is a nonzero quantity, equality (70) being taken 
literally, would have formed a logical contradiction, though it is not. In fact, this controversy is a spurious one, 
and could be explained as a manifestation of the system singularity. It is a well known fact that any financial 
crisis is a catastrophic shortage of liquidity. Hence equality  〈𝑀(𝑡∗)〉 = 𝑃(𝑠∗) = 0  just   demonstrates the 
absence of money at the critical point or, which is the same, its negligibly small quantity comparing to the total 
debt value. Thus, while the random quantity of money is not zero at the critical point, the expected money 
aggregate is zero. Financial system devastated by the crisis becomes singular at the critical point which is 
manifested by the “zero-money” condition.  
 
 
Percolation and bubble singularity 
Historically, financial bubbles were always   precursors of crises (Friedman, 1963; Kindleberger, 2000). 
Bursting bubble, in its turn, could be represented formally via debt singularity that appears due to herding. 
Singularity takes place for the systems of the infinite dimension while empirically all the systems are of finite 
dimensionality. Such a contradiction, well known in the natural sciences, manifests itself in the instable 
characteristic scale while samples are increasing.   
The model suggests the existence of the finite, however large, amount of the debt, 𝐵(𝑠∗), at the critical point 
of money issuance, 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠
∗. This feature, empirically quite correct since in reality debt outstanding is always a 
finite amount, theoretically could be generalized to embrace the theoretical concept of singularity as a solution 
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to a non-linear equation. Looking at this angle, linear function 𝐵(𝑠𝑡) serves as a poor representation of asset 
prices dynamics near the critical point since the latter, being chosen by the herd of investors, is a highly 
nonlinear one. Hence, formally, it seems to be more preferable to represent asset prices dynamics near the 
critical point as a singular process. It implies that the essence of herding is not only in the asset prices 
overvaluation but in the transformation of investors’ behavior into a highly nonlinear process of autocatalytic 
type result ing in the new debt acquisition. The pronounced mimicry of investors forces the debt value to 
increase, accelerating this process simultaneously. The asset prices start to behave both in nonlinear and almost 
deterministic manner. The stock quotations become a commonplace: the story goes that in 1929 Joe Kennedy 
(the father of the future US President) liquidated his portfolio when he heard that a shoeshine boy was giving 
stock tips repeatedly. The trajectory of the blown asset prices becomes the only one along which the singularity 
might take place. Since the “normal” debt reimbursement is implied by finite amount of the par debt, in the 
process of herding going on in the small neighborhood of the critical point investors would completely ignore 
such a possibility. The process of acquiring new debt becomes irrational once investors dampens the mere 
notion of a fair price of an asset.  
Irrational bubbles occur when investors develop an enthusiasm for particular class of assets like stocks in the 
late 1990ties or houses in the beginning of 2000ties11. Quickly blowing financial bubbles could be studied via 
models of financial percolation. Percolation is a huge body of knowledge with a large spectrum of applications 
from physics to chemistry, to earthquakes to avalanches to forest fires (Stauffer, 2009). In finance percolation 
models are useful in describing interactions of investors via geometric configurations of sites being formed 
randomly on a large 2D grid.   Monte Carlo simulation of percolation models shows that in the vicinity of a 
critical point these interactions might lead to formation of a huge spanning cluster of sites that transforms the 
quality of the financial system. The latter is due to a sudden increase of the “connectedness” among the hitherto 
independent financial investors (Smirnov, 2010). It follows that near the critical point financial bubble starts to 
expand in a highly nonlinear manner, probably first noticed by J.M. Keynes in his description of “speculation” 
and “enterprise” in financial market (Keynes, 1936). The model demonstrates that since investors acquire new 
debt unboundedly, the total debt value at the critical point becomes infinite, and the bubble bursts very quickly.  
 Taking these considerations into account, the new debt function (34) is to be modified to follow the singular 
process. The simplest modification of this sort could be proposed as the following: 
(71)  𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐾𝑠𝑡
𝛽
+ ℎ ∗ (𝑠∗ − 𝑠𝑡)
−𝛾 , 
where the herding parameter is 
 ℎ = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔;
  0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔;
  
and  𝛾 = 2.39 is one of the percolation invariant constants (Stauffer,2009). As it might be seen from Figure 11, 
herding modifies the new debt function (34) significantly only in the small neighborhood of the critical point 
 𝑠∗. 
                                                          
11 There is a long tradition to study rational financial  bubbles as well (Lux, Sornette, 2002) 
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Figure 11. The new debt function singularity. 
In our numerical example the new debt function was taken as 
𝑓(𝑠𝑡) = 0.2 𝑠𝑡
2.4 + ℎ ∗ (15.43 − 𝑠𝑡)
−2.39 . 
which, in the vicinity of the critical point, is dominated entirely by its second component.  Ignoring the first 
component in (61) and differentiating it through by money issuance, we get 
(72)    
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑠
~(𝑠∗ − 𝑠𝑡)
−𝛾−1 
where (~) is the sign of asymptotic equality. According to (72), in the small neighborhood of the critical point, 
the process of herding accelerates tremendously the debt accumulation that quickly leads to its singularity. 
It follows that near the critical point 𝑠 = 𝑠∗ financial bubble starts to expand in a highly nonlinear manner 
which bursts very quickly as represented in Figure 9. Repeat again that the same process, but on a much larger 
scale, is going on at the point 𝑠 = ?̃?. Being stimulated by herding investors acquire all new debt unboundedly, 
hence the total debt value at the critical point becomes infinite. In reality that signifies the burst of a bubble 
defined as a system singularity at the critical point. Looking at the different angle, however large amount of 
money becomes, in fact, negligibly small comparing to the infinitely large debt value. The shortage of liquidity 
which is a financial crisis per ce, is a result of the eventual bursting of a financial bubble that takes place at the 
critical point of money issuance. To overcome the consequences of a crisis, the money issuance in the model 
should be increased even further than before the crisis. That is precisely what had been done by major central 
banks in the aftermath of credit crunch 2007-09.   
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Figure 12. Financial  bubble and crisis. 
The trajectory of the blown bubble becomes the only one, and asset prices increase along it in nonlinear and 
almost deterministic manner.  In the process of herding investors, quite in accordance with “the greater fool 
theory”, completely ignore possibilities of   “normal” reimbursement of the par debt finite amount. Volumes 
and prices of the new debt acquiring quickly accelerate, especially in the small neighborhood of the critical 
point. These considerations could be implemented as a new debt function being a solution to a Bernoulli 
differential equation. As it is well known, a simple Bernoulli process contains singularity. The latter represents 
the bubble burst which is inevitable result of herding. The bubble singularity can be explained alternatively via 
growing leverage in the market characterized by increasing asset prices. This phenomenon was thoroughly 
explained in (Adrian, Shin, 2008).  
From the “pure financial” point of view, singularity could be explained as a natural consequence of interactions 
between debt and money. However large, but finite, amount of money becomes, at the critical point, negligibly 
small comparing to the infinitely large debt value. The same features are discernible in any actual crisis which 
is nothing more than the acute shortage of liquidity resulting from an eventual burst of a bubble. Like in the 
reality, to postpone the crisis at the second critical point, 𝑠 = 𝑠∗, money issuance should be increased, even to 
the larger amounts than before the crisis. In this important aspect, as it seems, the model could explain 
paradoxical, at first glance, behavior of major central banks after the credit crunch 2007-09.  instead of 
evaporating  “excess liquidity” having been existed on the eve of the crisis, all the major central banks  
dramatically increased assets in their balance sheets, thus pumping  trillions of dollars into the economy in 
several phases of  “quantitative easing“. 
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The model shows, rather convincingly in our view, that unbounded credit expansion would lead to imminent 
debt bubbles and inevitable crises intertwined into financial cycles going on along the axis of money issuance. 
These cycles could be conceived as a natural consequence of an expansionary monetary policy performed by 
central banks in contemporary economies. One of the evident corollaries out of such a premise would be the 
following: in order to escape a systemic collapse it is necessary to change the monetary policy. The simplest 
thing to do it (in the model) would be by making the rate of money issuance equal to zero,  𝑎 = 0. Pure random 
oscillations of money issuance, as it seems, would eliminate crises, thus curing the decease of debt cyclicity. 
So simple and so easy to prescribe the medicine in need, yet almost impossible to implement it!  
The paradox is easily explained, though, for in the modern financial world such a medicine would be almost 
unanimously considered as an event being much worse than the decease itself. Anything, however remotely 
resembling some sort of a standard to be imposed upon the money issuance, would be rejected, almost surely. 
Contemporary history of money is a persistent process of credit expansion, invariably. Very lately, in spite of 
the fact that excess of money was the major factor of credit crunch in 2007-09, the post-crisis policy of the G4 
central banks have been unambiguously an expansionary one (BIS,2012; Bloomberg, 2012). All the attempts 
of preventing the money and credit expansion seem to be totally unrealistic, undesirable and almost impossible. 
It is enough to mention, in this respect, either the just initiated the QE3 phase of the Fed policy, or the failed 
Bundesbank’s opposion to the ECB latest plans of debt purchases. Similia similibus curantur (similar things 
are cured by the like). Understandably, all the deliberations of returning to the gold or other standards would 
be viewed, almost unanimously, as reckless speculations extremely harmful, under the circumstances, for the 
fragile buds of economic recovery. Even the simple 4% rule of monetary expansion (the number could be 
accommodated to the current economic conditions) which had been proposed by M. Friedman in the 70-ties, 
seems to be out of question. Hence, were the central banks to continue their unilateral defense of creditors, thus  
totally ignoring interests of borrowers, then, under the circumstances, the L. vonMises assertion of the crises 
inevitability would have to be very likely realized as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
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Cмирнов А.Д.  Покупать или не покупать – вопрос не в этом: простая модель кредитной экспансии. 
Препринт  WP7/2012/0… М: НИУ ВШЭ, 2012. – 42с. 
 
В простой модели кредитной экспансии повышение ликвидности рынков меняет ориентацию 
инвесторов, заставляя их систематически завышать рыночные цены относительно истинной стоимости 
активов. Дивергенция цен формирует финансовый пузырь, динамика которого представлена 
стохастическими дифференциальными уравнениями денег и стоимости долга. Критические точки 
эмиссии ликвидности позволяют  различать фазы кредитного цикла, конкретизируя гипотезу 
финансовой нестабильности Х. Минского, причём большим размерам эмиссии денег соответствуют 
большие вероятности дефолта системы. Перифраза известной дилеммы Гамлета раскрывает 
иллюзорность попыток инвесторов избежать краха в условиях  растущей эмиссии денег, порождающей 
финансовые пузыри и кризисы. Без фатализма австрийской школы, модель поддерживает утверждение 
о том, что кредитная экспансия обязательно заканчивается системным кризисом, которому 
соответствует единичная вероятность  дефолта.  
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